NICHOLS (DO NOT DELETE)

12/19/2018 2:18 PM

CLOSING THE WAGE GAP: CITIES’ AND STATES’
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST PRIOR SALARY HISTORY
INQUIRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS MOVING FORWARD
Timothy J. Nichols*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to eliminate wage discrimination on account of sex,
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).1 The EPA amended
Section 6 of the Fair Labor and Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), adding a new
subsection.2 While this new subsection prohibits employers from paying
workers of one sex different wages than workers of the other sex for equal
work, the subsection also includes four enumerated exceptions.3 Despite
efforts to eliminate wage discrimination based on gender, women earned
eighty-three percent of what men earned in 2015 (granted, an increase from
sixty-four percent in 1980).4 While this pay gap is based on many factors,
such as (1) women being more likely to take breaks from careers to care for
a family, and (2) women being overrepresented in lower-paying occupations,
surveys reveal this gap may also be a result of gender discrimination.5
The broadest and most controversial of the exceptions contained in the
FLSA is a catch-all that permits disparities in pay between the genders
“based on any other factor other than sex.”6 Prior salary history, the focus
of this Comment, is a regularly relied-upon factor employers assert as a
“factor other than sex” when facing claims of gender-based wage
discrimination under the EPA and FLSA, as seen in the cases discussed
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Michigan-Ann Arbor.
1
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
2
Id. The Act created 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) that prohibits gender discrimination in wage
payment practices. Id. at 56–57.
3
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2018).
4
Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap
in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts/.
5
Id. Women were twice as likely as men to feel discriminated at work because of
gender (42% vs. 22%); also, 77% of women and 63% of men believe more changes must be
implemented to achieve gender equality in the workplace. Id.
6
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
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below.7 Further adding to the controversy is the fact that the different circuit
courts that have addressed the relationship between prior salary history and
the “factor other than sex” exception have applied different standards in
evaluating the claims.8 Two circuit courts have held that prior salary history
cannot be the sole factor in justifying pay disparities between the genders.9
Another circuit court allows reliance on prior salary history as the sole
justification, but conducts an inquiry into the reasonableness and asserted
reasons for the reliance.10 One circuit court accepts prior salary history as a
“factor other than sex” unequivocally.11 Finally, one circuit court just
recently eliminated prior salary history in its entirety from the catch-all
“factor other than sex” language.12
In an effort to continue closing the gender wage gap, multiple cities and
states around the country have enacted legislation that prohibits employers
from inquiring about applicants’ prior salary histories or requiring applicants
to disclose such information.13 All of these laws have a general prohibition
on employers seeking an applicant’s prior salary history but have certain
unique provisions and range from more restrictive to less restrictive
depending on the particular law.14 And although the push to institute these
types of laws has intensified, these laws have been met with resistance.15
This Comment argues that state and municipal legislatures, displeased
with the ongoing wage discrepancy between the genders and the analyses
and outcomes of the judiciary in cases alleging gender discrimination under
the EPA, are enacting these new laws to remove the most controversial
element of courts’ analysis. Part II of this Comment provides an in-depth
discussion of the EPA and the FLSA, along with the conflicting stances
federal circuit courts have adopted regarding the interplay between prior
salary history and one of the exceptions of the FLSA. Part III discusses the
laws currently enacted by cities and states across the United States as of this
writing and compares and contrasts elements of the laws. Part IV introduces
some of the emerging backlash against the laws and the implications the laws
7

See infra Part II.B–D.
See id.
9
See Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F. App’x. 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003); Irby
v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995).
10
See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 2003).
11
See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005).
12
See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
13
Dori Goldstein, More Laws Enacted to Ban Salary History Inquiries, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Jul. 5, 2017), https://www.bna.com/delaware-oregon-enact-b73014453430/; F.
Christopher Chrisbens, San Francisco Joins the Salary History Inquiry “Ban” Wagon, NAT’L
L. REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/san-francisco-joins-salaryhistory-inquiry-ban-wagon.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See infra Part IV.
8
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have across the country now and moving forward. Part V argues that the
cities and states enacting the laws are effectively circumventing one of the
exceptions under the FLSA by removing prior salary in its entirety from
consideration, eliminating the catch-all from the courts’ analysis. Part VI
suggests that, until prior salary history inquiry bans become universally
enacted, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ approach is the correct approach to
analyzing prior salary history as a “factor other than sex.” Part VII briefly
concludes.
II. THE EQUAL PAY ACT, “FACTORS OTHER THAN SEX,” AND THE
CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Equal Pay Act
As mentioned above, the EPA “prohibit[s] discrimination on account
of sex in the payment of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce.”16 The new subsection to FLSA added
by the EPA states:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions.17
The above text comes with a caveat, however, that a wage disparity
ordinarily impermissible under the statute is otherwise permissible: “where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”18 The “factor
other than sex” exception is the broadest-worded exception among the
enumerated exceptions, and the statute does not state a scope or any standard
for determining which factors qualify as a “factor other than sex.”19 Some
have argued prior salary history should be considered a “suspect factor”—a
factor that, if courts allow employers to rely on it to permanently justify
salary disparities, could perpetuate gender-based violations of the EPA.20
16

Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 56.
Id. at 56–57; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
18
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (emphasis added).
19
Jeanne M. Hamburg, Note, When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard
for the Identification of “Factors Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1085, 1087 (1989).
20
Id. at 1102.
17
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Courts have also indicated caution when dealing with prior salary
history as a “factor other than sex.”21 The Ninth Circuit noted that prior
salary history could be manipulated to provide a pretext for intentional
gender discrimination, and an employer could take advantage of “unfairly
low salaries historically paid to women” in order to perpetuate that
discrimination.22 The Seventh Circuit recognized the concern that previous
employers might have engaged in sex-based discrimination in wage
practices, thereby resulting in lower wages for female employees when
current employers rely on that tainted prior salary history.23 Despite this
caution, courts accept that prior salary history may justify current pay
disparities, but the courts are split on whether prior salary history satisfies
the “factor other than sex” exception under the EPA.24
B. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History and an Additional Factor
Some of the circuit courts adopted the viewpoint that prior salary
history must be paired with an additional factor in order to qualify as a
“factor other than sex” under the EPA. In Irby v. Bittick, a female criminal
investigator for a county sheriff’s department sued under the EPA when the
department paid two new male additions to the team substantially more than
she was paid.25 The defendants argued that the reliance on the prior salaries
of the male employees in setting their current salaries qualified as a
legitimate factor other than sex.26 The district court, however, rejected the
argument, holding that “[p]rior salary alone is not a legitimate ‘factor other
than sex.’”27 The court explained that if prior salary history was the sole
justification, the exception would swallow the rule, perpetuating gender pay
inequality.28 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that it consistently
adhered to the view that under the EPA a pay disparity between the genders
cannot be justified by prior salary history alone, and therefore the court
rejected reliance on prior salary history as a sole justification for the pay
disparity.29
While the court rejected a reliance on prior salary history by itself, it
nonetheless held that a defendant can rely on prior salary history as a “factor
21
See Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987); Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
22
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
23
Covington, 816 F.2d at 323.
24
See infra Part II.B–D; see also Hamburg, supra note 19, at 1085.
25
44 F.3d 949, 952–53 (11th Cir. 1995).
26
Id. at 955.
27
Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
28
Id.
29
Irby, 44 F.3d at 955 (citing Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th
Cir. 1988)).
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other than sex” when the defendant also relied on something else, such as
experience.30 The court found “there is no prohibition on utilizing prior pay
as part of a mixed-motive.”31 Since the defendants relied both on prior salary
history and the experience of the two new male employees, the Eleventh
Circuit was satisfied that the defendants properly relied on a “factor other
than sex” under the EPA to justify a pay disparity.32
In Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., a fired male employee sued for,
among other things, gender discrimination based on Williams-Sonoma
paying him less than a female employee in the same position.33 The plaintiff
suggested that Williams-Sonoma adhered to the “market factor” theory,
whereby an employer justifies wage disparities based on the pay rates the
two genders command in the marketplace.34 After rejecting this contention
for lacking relevance, the court noted that the focus of the plaintiff’s
argument was that Williams-Sonoma matched the female employee’s prior
salary.35 The Tenth Circuit then stated that considering a new employee’s
prior salary history is not prohibited under Section 206(d)(iv) of the EPA.36
Instead, it is the employer’s sole reliance on prior salary to justify a pay
disparity that is precluded by the EPA; and when an employer bases a new
employee’s salary on prior salary history and something else like
qualifications and experience, the employer has successfully invoked the
“factor other than sex” defense.37 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, by
requiring an additional factor other than prior salary history for a “factor
other than sex” defense, impose the strictest, most scrutinizing view of this
exception under the EPA.
C. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History, Case-by-Case, and
Reasonableness
Another circuit court accepts the use of prior salary history as the sole
factor in a “factor other than sex” defense, unlike the above-mentioned
cases,38 but still conducts a factual analysis on a case-by-case basis or
inquiries into the reasonableness of the reliance on prior salary history. In
Taylor v. White,39 a female United States Army employee sued her employer
because her male colleagues performing the same work received higher
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id.
Id.
Id. at 957.
70 F. App’x 500, 504 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003).
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pay.40 She contended that an employer should be prohibited from relying on
prior salary history or a salary retention policy to avoid liability under the
EPA because relying on said factors allows the perpetuation of wage
inequalities.41 The Eighth Circuit, however, stated that nothing on the face
of the EPA indicates any limitations to the catch-all “factor other than sex”
defense, and the legislative history bolsters the view of a broad interpretation
of this catch-all exception.42 While the court acknowledged that even though
a salary retention policy could be used to perpetuate unequal wages based on
past discrimination, this concern does not dictate adopting a per se rule
finding all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory.43
Rather than adopt a per se rule, the court instead recognized “the need
to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention
policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay.”44 The Eighth
Circuit thought a case-by-case analysis into the reliance on prior salary
history or salary retention policies with a discerning eye on the alleged
gender-based practices would protect certain freedoms in business as
Congress intended with the “factor other than sex” defense.45 What the
Eighth Circuit did not endorse, however, is conducting a reasonableness
inquiry into the employer’s actions or limiting the application of a salary
retention policy to exigent circumstances only, as it would unnecessarily
narrow the intent of the “factor other than sex” defense.46 While the Eighth
Circuit states that prior salary history alone satisfies the “factor other than
sex” factor under the EPA, the case-by-case factual analysis indicates this
circuit will view reliance on prior salary history alone with some suspicion.
D. The Circuit Split: Eliminating Prior Salary History in its Entirety
The Ninth Circuit initially took a more narrow view than the Eighth
Circuit, but still broader than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, where a
female public school employee sued the county after discovering it paid her
less than her male colleagues.47 When the county moved for summary
judgment, it acknowledged the pay disparity but based the discrepancy on a
factor other than sex—prior salary history.48 The district court rejected this
40

Id. at 714.
Id. at 717.
42
Id. at 717–18. “[T]he catch-all provision is necessary due to the impossibility of
predicting and listing each and every exception.” Id. at 718.
43
Id. at 718.
44
Id.
45
Taylor, 321 F.3d at 720.
46
Id.
47
Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2017) (en banc).
48
Id.
41
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defense and denied summary judgment, concluding that reliance exclusively
on prior salary history is not a satisfactory “factor other than sex” defense.49
Relying on precedent, the Ninth Circuit initially held that there is no
strict prohibition against using prior salary history under the EPA, but it does
not automatically qualify as a “factor other than sex” for purposes of the
affirmative defense.50 Rather, prior salary history alone could satisfactorily
justify a pay disparity only when “the factor ‘effectuate[s] some business
policy’ and that the employer ‘use[s] the factor reasonably in light of the
employer’s stated purpose as well as its other practices.’”51 When the
plaintiff argued that relying on prior salary history alone would perpetuate
existing pay disparities and therefore undermine the EPA’s intended goal,
the court indicated that, in deciding the very same issue in Kouba v. Allstate
Insurance Co., requiring the employer to show that using prior salary history
effectuated some business policy and the factor was used reasonably would
alleviate these concerns.52
On rehearing en banc, however, the full Ninth Circuit eliminated prior
salary history from the “factor other than sex” entirely.53 The court reasoned
that to continue to allow employers to justify pay disparities with prior salary
histories would contravene the text and history of the EPA and “vitiate the
very purpose for which the Act stands.”54 Furthermore, if employers were
able to take advantage of the “factor other than sex” catch-all with prior
salary history, a sex-based salary disparity would be based on the very sexbased salary differentials the EPA is supposed to eliminate.55 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit narrowed the “factor other than sex” catch-all to legitimate,
job-related factors56 and found that prior salary, alone or combined with
other factors, is not job related and therefore does not qualify for the catchall defense.57
The Ninth Circuit grounded its reasoning in several arguments. First,
looking at the historical context of the EPA, the court found that when the
EPA was enacted, prior salary history would have definitely reflected
previous gender discrimination in the marketplace.58 Further, Congress
could not have intended to permit employers to rely on previous
49

Id.
Id. at 1165.
51
Id. (quoting Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1982)).
52
Id. at 1166 (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876–78).
53
See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
54
Id. at 456–57.
55
Id. at 457.
56
Such factors include “a prospective employee’s experience, educational background,
ability, or prior job performance.” Id. at 460.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 461.
50
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discriminatory wages, thereby perpetuating the gender disparity.59 Second,
relying on canons of statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the
“factor other than sex” catch-all to job-related factors. The canon of noscitur
a sociis, whereby a word’s meaning is understood by surrounding words,
dictates that the specific exceptions in the EPA of seniority, merit, and
productivity relating to job qualifications extend to the “factor other than
sex” language, imposing a limitation to only legitimate, job-related
reasons.60 Additionally, the canon of ejusdem generis, where general words
are construed to be similar in nature to enumerated preceding specific words,
supports this conclusion.61 Third and finally, the court took notice of the
lobbying efforts of industry representatives who were concerned that
legitimate, job-related factors in determining pay would not be covered
under the other exceptions, and concluded that the catch-all was only added
to assuage these concerns.62
In finding that salary history cannot be used in setting current pay, the
Ninth Circuit overruled Kouba, announcing that prior salary history is not
job related and that continuing to allow employers to rely on such would
perpetuate the gender-based discrimination the EPA was intended to
expunge.63 The Ninth Circuit takes by far the most extreme view of prior
salary history, railing against its use to perpetuate gender wage disparities
and eliminating it from the “factor other than sex” analysis entirely.
E. The Circuit Split: Deference to the Defense
One circuit court, in the broadest interpretation of the “factor other than
sex” defense under the EPA, accepts prior salary history as a factor other
than sex without any qualifications or limitations.64 A female employee for
the Department of Human Services in Illinois sued under the EPA, putting
forward two arguments: (1) prior salary history must include an acceptable
business reason; and (2) the use of prior salary history discriminates because
all pay systems inherently discriminate based on sex.65 The Seventh Circuit
noted how four appellate courts accept prior salary history as a “factor other
than sex,” but only if the employer had an acceptable business reason.66 In
looking to the actual statute, however, the court found that nothing in Section
206(d) allows a court to set standards on what qualifies as an acceptable
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Rizo, 887 F.3d at 461.
Id. at 461–62.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 463–64.
Id. at 468.
See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 468.
Id.
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business practice, and that “the statute asks whether the employer has a
reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’ reason.”67 As long as
employers avoid forbidden reliance on criteria like race or sex, employers
may set their own standards for determining pay.68 The Seventh Circuit’s
rule for prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” is reduced down to a
single sentence: “[T]he employer may act for any reason, good or bad, that
is not one of the prohibited criteria such as race, sex, age, or religion.”69
There is one caveat, however, to the Seventh Circuit’s rule. The court
acknowledged that, in certain lines of employment, wage patterns could be
discriminatory, but the court also noted how this must be proved and not
assumed.70 Where an employee has been discriminated against in a prior job
in violation of the EPA, relying on those wages to determine a new salary
would perpetuate said discrimination in violation of the EPA.71 Absent
evidence that plaintiff’s prior job engaged in wage discrimination in
violation of the EPA, defendants’ reliance on that prior wage history was
proper, and the court held the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment.72 The Seventh Circuit, unlike all of the cases mentioned above,
grants the most deference to an employer’s use of prior salary history as a
“factor other than sex.”
III. THE LAWS FROM VARYING CITIES AND STATES
Given the varying approaches taken by the federal circuits regarding
prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA in conjunction
with the fact that all circuits accept prior salary history as a factor to some
degree,73 cities and states across the country have simplified the analysis by
removing prior salary history as a factor altogether.
A. The Massachusetts Law
The Massachusetts law is intended to close the wage gap between the
genders, with a focus on the phenomenon that lower wages and salaries of
women follow them throughout their careers.74 The governor signed the bill
into law on August 1, 2016, and took effect July 2018.75 It also bears
67

Id.
Id. at 468–69.
69
Id. at 469.
70
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 470.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
See supra Part II.
74
Stacy Cowley, Illegal in Massachusetts: Asking Your Salary in a Job Interview, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/business/dealbook/wage-gapmassachusetts-law-salary-history.html.
75
Id.
68
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mentioning that this new Massachusetts law includes a codification of
Section 206(d) of the FLSA as amended by the EPA, but noticeably absent
in the enumerated exceptions is the broad “factor other than sex” language
of the EPA.76
As an initial matter, the law prohibits an employer from seeking an
applicant’s prior salary history from the applicant’s current or former
employer.77 Once the employer has extended an employment offer,
including compensation, to the applicant, however, said applicant can give
written authorization to the employer to confirm prior salary history with
prior employers.78 The Massachusetts law makes it unlawful for an
employer to prohibit an employee from discussing either the employee’s
own, or another employee’s, wages as a condition of employment.79 The
employer also may not screen applicants by setting a minimum or maximum
criteria that the applicant’s prior salary or compensation history must satisfy;
nor may the employer condition being granted an interview or continued
consideration for an offer of employment on the applicant’s disclosure of
prior salary history.80 Lastly, the law forbids an employer from firing or
otherwise retaliating against an employee because the employee: (1) resisted
any action by the employer prohibited under this new law; (2) already did or
is about to complain or institute a proceeding against the employer for
violating any of the above-mentioned prohibitions; (3) testified or is about
to testify or otherwise assist an investigation into violations of the law; or (4)
revealed the employee’s own salary information or asked about another
employee’s salary.81
The Massachusetts law does grant a degree of reprieve with a safe
harbor provision, however, for any employer charged with gender-based
wage discrimination.82 It appears, however, that this safe harbor does not
apply where the employer violates the prohibitions on seeking prior salary
history.83 Provided the employer demonstrates that within the last three
years the employer had performed a pay practice self-evaluation and has
made reasonable progress towards eliminating gender-based pay
differentials, the employer has an affirmative defense.84 The employer can
design this self-evaluation, but the evaluation must be reasonable in detail
76

Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2016), with Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2018).
77
§ 105A(c)(2).
78
Id.
79
Id. § 105A(c)(1).
80
Id. § 105A(c)(2).
81
Id. § 105A(c)(3).
82
Id. § 105A(d).
83
See § 105A(d).
84
Id.
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and scope relative to the employer’s size or consistent with the attorney
general’s standard templates or forms.85 It is important to note that this safe
harbor provision does not apply to an alleged violation of Massachusetts’s
general gender-based wage discrimination law if the alleged violation
occurred prior to the completion of the self-evaluation or six months
thereafter.86 Simplified, Massachusetts’s law prohibits employers from
conditioning employment on an applicant’s disclosure of prior salary history,
seeking such salary history information without the consent of the applicant
or prior to offering an employment opportunity with compensation, or
retaliating against any employee or applicant that opposes such illegal
practices.87
B. The Philadelphia Law
Philadelphia enacted its own prohibition against employers requiring
applicants to disclose prior salary history, signed into law by the mayor on
January 23, 2017, intended to be effective 120 days later on May 23, 2017.88
In its findings, the Philadelphia City Council stated: (1) that the gender wage
gap still exists in the United States; (2) that this gap has narrowed only by
less than half a penny per year since 1963 when the EPA was passed; (3)
basing a worker’s current wages or salary on prior salary history only
perpetuates the gender wage disparity; and (4) salary offers should not be
based on prior salary history.89
In order to combat the above-mentioned issues, the Philadelphia law
makes it unlawful for an employer to: (1) inquire into an applicant’s salary
history; (2) require the applicant to disclose prior salary history; (3) condition
employment or consideration for an interview or employment on the
applicant disclosing such information; or (4) retaliate against an applicant
for refusing to comply with or opposing such salary history inquiries.90
These prohibitions mirror those of the Massachusetts law described above.91
Unlike Massachusetts, however, Philadelphia imposes an additional
restriction that states an employer cannot rely on salary history at any stage
in the employment process, such as in negotiating or drafting a contract.92
The employer may rely on such information provided that the applicant

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Id. § 105A(c)(1)–(4).
Phila., Pa., Ordinance 160840, § 2 (Jan. 23, 2017).
PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(1) (2017).
Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(i).
See supra Part III.A.
§ 9-1131(2)(a)(ii).
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“knowingly and willing disclosed his or her wage history to the employer.”93
None of these provisions apply to employers following state, federal or local
law specifically permitting disclosure or verification of wage history for
employment purposes, however.94 Absent from the Philadelphia law is a
safe harbor provision as found in the Massachusetts law,95 and the
Philadelphia statute does not include a provision permitting an employer to
seek the applicant’s prior salary history after an offer of employment has
been negotiated and extended to the applicant like in Massachusetts and
Delaware.96
The Philadelphia law imposes the same general prohibitions on an
employer requiring an applicant to disclose prior salary history or
conditioning consideration for employment on such disclosure, seeking such
information from current or prior employers, and prohibiting retaliation
against applicants who resist.97 Philadelphia goes further though, prohibiting
an employer from relying on prior salary history unless the applicant reveals
such information knowingly and willingly.98
C. The New York City Law
New York City enacted its prohibition against salary history inquiries
when the mayor signed it on May 5, 2017, with the effective date being
October 31, 2017.99 The law makes it unlawful for an employer to “inquire
about the salary history of an applicant for employment.”100 “Inquire” means
any type of question or statement to the applicant, the applicant’s current or
prior employer, or a current or former agent or employee of such employer
in any method for the applicant’s salary history.101 The inquiry definition
also extends to searching publicly available records for such information.102
Similar to Philadelphia, New York City also prohibits an employer
from relying on prior salary history for determining salary, benefits, or other
compensation to offer to an applicant at any stage of the hiring process.103 If
an applicant, without prompting, voluntarily discloses prior salary history to
93

Id.
Id. § 9-1131(2)(b).
95
Compare id. § 9-1131, with MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149, § 105A(d) (2016).
96
Compare § 9-1131, with supra Part III.A., and infra Part III.D.
97
§ 9-1131(2)(a)(i)–(ii).
98
Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii).
99
Brie Kluytenaar, Update on New York City Legislation Limiting Salary History
Inquiries, NAT’L L. REV. (May 10, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-newyork-city-legislation-limiting-salary-history-inquiries.
100
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(b)(1) (2017).
101
Id. § 8-107(25)(a).
102
Id.
103
Id. § 8-107(25)(b)(2).
94
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an employer, its employee or agent, or an employment agent, the prospective
employer is free to rely on such information.104 Furthermore, an employer
may discuss with an applicant the applicant’s expectations as to salary,
benefits, and other compensation, provided there is no inquiry into prior
salary history.105
Additionally, like Philadelphia, the law does not apply where federal,
state, or local law requires disclosure of such salary history.106 The New
York City law, however, also exempts internal transfers and promotions and
public employee positions where salary is guided by collective bargaining
procedures.107 Lastly, where an employer seeks to verify non-salary-related
information or conduct a background check and discovers salary-related
information, the employer has not violated the law but still may not rely on
such information in determining an applicant’s offered salary.108
New York City’s prohibition against salary history inquiries generally
mirrors that of Philadelphia on what employer actions are prohibited, but
also seems to provide more protections for employers, mainly in allowing
discussions about salary expectations109 and shielding the employer for
accidental salary history discoveries.110
D. The Delaware Law
When signing the salary history ban into law, Delaware Governor John
Carney was quoted as saying: “‘[a]ll Delawareans should expect to be
compensated equally for performing the same work . . . [t]his new law will
help guarantee that across our state, and address a persistent wage gap
between men and women.’”111 The law went into effect on December 14,
2017.112 Like Massachusetts,113 Delaware prohibits an employer or an
employer’s agent from screening applicants based on prior salary history,
including requiring prior salary to satisfy either a minimum or maximum

104

Id. § 8-107(25)(d).
Id. § 8-107(25)(c).
106
§ 8-107(25)(e)(1).
107
Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(2), (4). “Collective bargaining” is defined as “[n]egotiations
between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the
conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and fringe benefits.” Collective
Bargaining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016).
108
§ 8-107(25)(e)(3).
109
Id. § 8-107 (25)(c).
110
Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(3).
111
Alex Vuocolo, Delaware First State to Enact Salary History Ban, DEL. BUS. TIMES
(Jun. 15, 2017), http://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/delaware-first-state-enact-salaryhistory-ban/.
112
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B (2017).
113
See supra Part III.A.
105
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criteria.114 The employer also may not “[s]eek the compensation history of
an applicant from the applicant or a current or former employer.”115 Similar
to New York City,116 however, an employer may still discuss and negotiate
expected compensation with the applicant, provided that there is no request
or requirement for the applicant’s compensation history.117 Furthermore,
similar to Massachusetts,118 an employer can seek an applicant’s salary
history after an employment offer that includes compensation has been
extended to the applicant; but differing from Massachusetts, this offer must
also be accepted.119 This inquiry is solely for confirming the applicant’s
prior salary history.120
It is important to note that the Delaware law is certainly the barest, least
descriptive of the laws enacting prohibitions on salary history inquiries
described in this Comment.121 This could cause problems for employers,
uncertain of what exactly is prohibited and what is allowed. Regardless, the
Delaware law does what every other law described in this Comment does:
prohibits employers from inquiring into the salary history of an applicant
while granting an employer flexibility to make a competitive offer to that
applicant.122
E. The Oregon Law
Oregon’s ban on seeking prior salary history went into effect in October
2017; however, civil actions against employers who violate this law are not
permitted until January 2024.123 Oregon, in its laws prohibiting salary
history inquiries, also includes a codification of Section 206(d)(1) of the
FLSA.124 Oregon’s codification includes a number of exceptions justifying
pay disparities between employees of different genders, but, as seen in
Massachusetts, the catch-all “factor other than sex” language has been
removed.125 The absence of this catch-all language is telling—had
114

§ 709B(b)(1).
Id. § 709B(b)(2).
116
See supra Part III.C.
117
§ 709B(d).
118
See supra Part III.A.
119
§ 709B(e).
120
Id.
121
Compare id. § 709(B), with MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149, § 105A (2016), and PHILA.,
PA., CODE § 9-1131 (2017), and N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25) (2017), and OR.
REV. STAT. § 652.220 (2017), and S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE § 3300J (2017).
122
§ 709(B).
123
Mark A. Crabtree & Claudia A. Halasz, Oregon Enacts Expansive Pay Equity Law,
NAT’L L. REV. (Jun. 16, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/oregon-enactsexpansive-pay-equity-law.
124
§ 652.220(2).
125
Compare id., with § 105A(b), and Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat.
115
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Massachusetts or Oregon desired the “factor other than sex” language, it
would have been included.
Turning to the enactments specific to salary history, Oregon has made
it unlawful for an employer to “[s]creen job applicants based on current or
past compensation.”126 While not explicitly stated, this condition certainly
includes the minimum-maximum criteria element already seen in
Massachusetts and Delaware.127 The law also forbids an employer from
using current or past compensation as a factor in determining the
compensation offered to a prospective employee.128 This prohibition,
however, does not apply to an employer when a current employee is
considered for a transfer, move, or hire to a new position with that same
employer.129 Furthermore, under chapter 659A of the Oregon Revised
Statute, an employer cannot seek an applicant’s prior salary history from the
applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer.130 Once the
employer has extended an employment offer that includes the amount of
compensation, an employer can request written authorization from the
applicant to confirm his or her prior salary history.131 This provision is in
line with what Massachusetts and Delaware require.132
Oregon, like Massachusetts, also offers a safe harbor provision in its
law that alleviates an employer from liability under certain conditions; yet,
unlike Massachusetts, this safe harbor appears to not apply to violations of
the prohibition against salary history inquiry.133 The employer will be
neither liable for compensatory nor for punitive damages if, within three
years, the employer conducted a good-faith equal-pay analysis that was
reasonable in detail and scope according to the size of the employer and
related to the protected class in the suit.134 The wage disparity must also
have been eliminated for the specific plaintiff, and the employer must have
taken reasonable and substantial steps to eliminate the wage disparity for the
protected class overall.135

56., and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
126
§ 652.220(1)(c).
127
See supra Parts III.A, D.
128
§ 652.220(1)(d).
129
Id.
130
Id. § 659A; H.R. 2005, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 4 (Or. 2017).
131
Id.
132
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(3) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
709(B)(b)(2) (2017); id. § 709(B)(e). Note that Delaware also requires the offer to be
accepted.
133
Compare Or. H.R. 2005 § 12, with § 105A(d).
134
§ 12(1)(a)(A)–(B).
135
Id. § 12(b).
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Oregon is prohibiting employers from screening applicants based on
prior salary and using prior salary in determining how much to offer an
applicant,136 as well as seeking this information from the applicant or the
applicant’s current or former employer.137 But the employer also has a
degree of leeway; an employer is allowed to confirm prior salary after
extending a job offer which includes compensation,138 and the employer is
protected by a safe harbor provision.139
F. The San Francisco Law
In almost identical language to the Philadelphia law, the San Francisco
City Council found that: (1) women in San Francisco suffer from a gender
wage gap; (2) the gender wage gap has narrowed less than half a penny per
year since the 1963 enactment of the EPA; (3) seeking prior salary history
contributes to the wage gap by perpetuating wage inequalities; (4) women
are put at a disadvantage in negotiating salary when required to disclose prior
salary history; (5) prior salary history is unlikely to not be a factor in
negotiating or setting a salary offer when an employer is able to ask such
information; (6) the new law will ensure that a woman’s prior wages will not
weigh down her earnings throughout her career; and (7) the new law will
ensure employees and employers negotiate salaries based on qualifications
rather than prior salary history.140
Turning to the law itself, an employer is prohibited from inquiring into
an applicant’s prior salary history.141 In this context, “inquire” means any
direct or indirect form of communication in any type of attempt to gather this
information from or about the applicant.142 Further, an employer cannot
consider an applicant’s prior salary history in determining what salary to
offer, regardless of whether the applicant discloses the prior salary history
voluntarily.143 This is a sharp deviation from the exceptions included in both
the Philadelphia and New York City laws.144 Also, San Francisco, as
displayed in previously discussed laws, prohibits an employer from refusing
to hire or in any other way retaliating against an applicant for refusing to
disclose prior salary history.145
136

OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(1)(c)–(d) (2017).
Id. § 659A; Or. H.R. 2005 § 4.
138
Id.
139
Or. H.R. 2005 § 12.
140
S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE § 3300J.2(a)–(d), (l)–(m) (2017).
141
Id. § 3300J.4(a).
142
Id. § 3300J.3.
143
Id. § 3300J.4(b).
144
Compare id., with PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii) (2017), and N.Y.C., N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(d) (2017).
145
§ 3300J.4(c).
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In another unique feature of the law, San Francisco also imposes
liability on current and former employers—current or former employers
cannot release the salary history of a current or former employee to said
employee’s current or prospective employer without written authorization
from the employee.146 Only San Francisco imposes such a restriction on
current or previous employers.147 Lastly, an applicant can voluntarily
disclose his or her prior salary history after an employer makes an initial
salary offer to negotiate a different salary.148 Only then may an employer
use such a disclosure as it strictly relates to making a counter-offer.149 While
San Francisco imposes many of the provisions already enacted by other cities
and states, it is certainly the strictest, most pro-employee of the laws in light
of two key provisions: first, the provision that prohibits an employer from
considering prior salary history after an applicant makes a voluntary
disclosure, and second, the provision that imposes liability on an employer
revealing the information, instead of just on the employer seeking the
information.
G. The California Law
California introduced a bill intending to narrow the gender wage gap
by prohibiting employers from asking about prior salary history.150 It was
unclear whether it would be signed into law, however, as the Governor of
California, Jerry Brown, had vetoed a bill implementing the same laws two
years earlier after being pressured by business groups.151 At the time, the
governor was quoted as saying that the law prevented employers “from
obtaining relevant information with little evidence that this would assure
more equitable wages.”152 The measure in 2015, however, had no G.O.P.
support and received not one G.O.P. vote, whereas the more recent bill was
co-authored by two Republicans and the bill garnered ten G.O.P. votes.153
The 2017 bill did have opposition from powerful business groups, as the
Chamber of Commerce gathered together an extensive coalition of
detractors.154

146

Id. § 3300J.4(d).
See supra Parts III.A–E.
148
§ 3300J.4(e).
149
Id.
150
Margot Roosevelt, Previous Salary? Soon, the Question Might Be Illegal in
California, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/11/
previous-salary-soon-the-question-might-be-illegal/.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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Id.
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The Governor signed the bill into law on October 12, 2017.155 An
employer is now prohibited from relying on an applicant’s salary history as
a factor for deciding whether to offer the applicant a job or how much to
pay.156 The employer also may not seek such salary history information—
whether it be oral or in writing—in person or through an agent, of an
applicant.157 An applicant may voluntarily disclose his or her salary history
information, and once an applicant does so, an employer is free to consider
and rely on that information for determining an applicant’s offered salary.158
These prohibitions will not apply to any salary history information that is
disclosable according to state or federal law,159 but are enforceable against
“all employers, including state and local government employers and the
Legislature.”160 The bill went into effect on January 1, 2018.161
IV. THE BACKLASH, IMPLICATIONS, AND OUTLOOK IN THE WAKE OF
THESE LAWS
A. The Legal Backlash
These laws have faced backlash, however, including the Philadelphia
ordinance that is now being challenged in court; the Chamber of Commerce
of Greater Philadelphia162 has brought suit to strike down the ordinance.163
Experts believe this suit “may set the tone for future litigation over payhistory laws elsewhere.”164

155

Margot Roosevelt, California Bosses Can No Longer Ask You About Your Previous
Salary, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/10/12/inbid-to-fight-gender-pay-gap-gov-jerry-brown-signs-salary-privacy-law/.
156
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a) (West 2017) (amended 2018).
157
Id. § 432.3(b).
158
Id. § 432.3(g)–(h).
159
Id. § 432.3(e).
160
Id. § 432.3(f).
161
David Lazarus, From Weed to Wages, the New Year Ushers in New Laws Affecting
Consumers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la
-fi-lazarus-new-california-laws-20180102-story.html.
162
A chamber of commerce is an association of businesses for a geographic area that
seeks to further the collective interests of the group. What Is a Chamber, ASS’N OF CHAMBER
OF COMM. EXECUTIVES, https://secure.acce.org/whatisachamber/? (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
Business owners voluntarily form these associations in order to advocate for economic growth
and business interests. Id.
163
Dan Packel, Pay Inquiry Bans to Get Crucial First Test in Philly, LAW360 (Apr. 10,
2017), https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=45714273-4743-48509fe1-b40c4bc8aa5a&pdworkfolderid=b41c96b8-1a14-4743-adb1-bcacd81ec3f8&ecomp=tx
ptk&earg=b41c96b8-1a14-4743-adb1-bcacd81ec3f8&prid=ec5d1f6e-79b0-4046-99fe-879e
ba00ef0c.
164
Id.
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In its complaint, the Chamber stated that rather than achieve gender
wage equality, the law “will chill the protected speech of employers and
immeasurably complicate their task of making informed hiring decisions.”165
The Chamber, in its main argument, asserted that the ordinance violates
employers’ First Amendment rights to free speech because it is both overand under-inclusive,166 and that the ordinance violates both the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.167 As to
the First Amendment, the Chamber alleges that the ordinance imposes both
content-based and speaker-based restrictions on employers’ speech because
employers, and only employers, are prohibited from asking about prior
salary history.168 Also, prohibiting employers from seeking such information
is a content-based restriction on employers’ speech, which can only
withstand strict scrutiny when the restriction serves a compelling state
interest.169 The Chamber alleges the law serves no compelling interest
because while Philadelphia has a compelling interest in eliminating pay
disparities based on gender discrimination, that interest does not extend to
wage differences based on factors such as skill or training, which the
Chamber believes the new law covers.170 The complaint further alleges that
the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause because the ordinance is
impermissibly vague by failing to define key terms;171 and it violates the
Commerce Clause because the law extends to any employer that either
employs at least one employee or transacts business in Philadelphia, even if
that employer is in another state.172 Based on these allegations, the Chamber
has requested preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent Philadelphia
from enforcing the ordinance.173
After receiving the Chamber’s complaint, on April 19, 2017, the judge
stayed the effective date of the ordinance pending the outcome of the
Chamber’s motion for a preliminary injunction.174 In order to avoid
confusion, the city agreed to the stay for employers and employees as the

165

Complaint at 2, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., No. 171548 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2017).
166
Id. at 4–5.
167
Id. at 5–6.
168
Id. at 13.
169
Id. at 14.
170
Id. at 15.
171
Complaint at 17, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., No. 171548 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2017).
172
Id. at 19–20.
173
Id. at 27.
174
Michael Tanenbaum, Philly Salary History Bill Put on Hold Amid Legal Challenge,
PHILLYVOICE (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.phillyvoice.com/philly-wage-equity-bill-put-holdamid-legal-challenge/. The effective date of the ordinance was May 23, 2017. Id.
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legal process moved forward.175 On May 30, 2017, however, Judge Mitchell
S. Goldberg, presiding over this litigation, found that the Chamber of
Commerce failed to demonstrate with specific facts that one or more of its
members will be directly affected by Philadelphia’s ordinance so as to
establish standing.176 Without such facts, the court cannot determine
whether any of the individual members would have standing to bring suit;
because the Chamber could not show that at least one of its members would
have standing to sue, the Chamber itself does not have standing to sue, and
the judge granted the City’s motion to dismiss.177 The matter was dismissed,
however, without prejudice, and the Chamber was granted leave to amend
its complaint within fourteen days of the order.178
On June 13, 2017, the Chamber filed its amended complaint, alleging
the same constitutional violations as before; however, this time the amended
complaint included an extensive outline of the ways that the ordinance will
harm certain particular enumerated members as exemplars for the group as
a whole.179 Philadelphia did not file a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, so this lawsuit will be decided on the merits.180
On April 30, 2018, the district court ruled on the Chamber’s motion for
a preliminary injunction.181 The court bifurcated its decision, analyzing the
ordinance in two parts: the “Inquiry Provision” that prohibits an employer
from asking about prior salary history and the “Reliance Provision” that
prohibits an employer from relying on prior salary history in setting current
salary.182 In determining the Chamber’s likelihood of success on the merits
of its constitutional challenge, the district court ruled that, since an inquiry
into prior salary history occurs in the context of a job negotiation, the Inquiry
Provision regulates commercial speech.183 Finding a law regulates
commercial speech is critical because commercial speech receives less
protection from regulation and laws regulating such speech are analyzed

175

Id.
Order, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of City of Phila., No. 17-1548
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2017) (granting the City’s motion to dismiss).
177
Id. at 9–10.
178
Id. at 10.
179
Amended Complaint at 14–22, Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of
Phila., No. 17-1548 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017).
180
Stephanie J. Peet & Timothy M. McCarthy, Philadelphia’s Wage-History Ordinance
Faces First Amendment Challenge, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Jul. 21, 2017),
https://wlflegalpulse.com/2017/07/21/philadelphias-wage-history-ordinance-faces-firstamendment-challenge/.
181
See Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., 319 F. Supp. 3d 773
(E.D. Pa. 2018).
182
See id. at 782.
183
Id. at 783–84.
176
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under an intermediate scrutiny standard.184 The intermediate scrutiny test for
commercial speech is as follows: is the regulated speech unlawful or
misleading?185 If not, the next question is whether the government’s asserted
interest is substantial.186 If yes, the court asks whether the regulation directly
advances the government’s asserted interest and whether the regulation is as
least extensive as necessary to serve that interest.187
As to the case at bar, the district court found that inquiring into prior
salary history is not unlawful nor is it misleading, and as such the Inquiry
Provision does not regulate unlawful or misleading speech.188 Both parties
agreed that the City had a substantial interest in promoting wage equality and
reducing the prevalence of discriminatory wage disparities.189 Analyzing
whether the ordinance directly advances the City’s asserted interest, the
district court noted that the Supreme Court emphasized that this prong could
not be satisfied with mere speculation or conjecture, but must show that the
harms sought to be avoided are real and the regulation will reduce them to a
material degree.190 The district court concluded there was insufficient
evidence establishing discriminatory wages being perpetuated in subsequent
wages contributing to a discriminatory wage gap.191 Lacking such evidence,
the court found that it was “impossible” to ascertain whether the Inquiry
Provision would directly advance the City’s substantial interest of reducing
discriminatory wage disparities and achieving wage equality.192 As a result,
the court ruled that the Inquiry Provision violated the First Amendment such
that the Chamber was likely to succeed on the merits as to its constitutional
challenge to the Inquiry Provision.193
For the Reliance Provision, however, the district court held that relying
on salary history to set new salaries does not involve speech and therefore
the Chamber could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that
the Reliance Provision violates the First Amendment.194 Furthermore, the
court found that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague nor was the
scope of the ordinance beyond the territory of Philadelphia such that the
ordinance would violate the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions.195
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

See id. at 784.
Id. at 785.
Id.
Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 785.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 800.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805–06.
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As to the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test, the court
found the Chamber could not show irreparable harm from the Reliance
Provision because it would not be able to show that the Reliance Provision
was unconstitutional.196 Since the Chamber showed a real and actual
deprivation of First Amendment rights under the Inquiry Provision, however,
the Chamber demonstrated irreparable harm from the Inquiry Provision.197
The City of Philadelphia could not show irreparable harm because it could
not “claim a legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law” and
upholding freedoms under the First Amendment outweighed any harm the
City may experience under the preliminary injunction.198 Lastly, since a
great weight of precedent exists stating that “there is a significant public
interest in upholding First Amendment principles,” the district court found
that granting the preliminary injunction was in the public interest.199
Based on the above analysis, the district court concluded that the
Inquiry Provision violated the First Amendment and granted the Chamber’s
preliminary injunction but the Reliance Provision did not violate the First
Amendment and therefore would remain intact.200 This decision, however,
effectively renders the Reliance Provision useless because if an employer
can ask about prior salary history, it will be near impossible for an applicant
to prove that the employer secretly relied on that information in setting the
current salary. Both parties appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.201 Being a case of first impression, the final
result of this lawsuit could resonate throughout the country with other state
and city legislatures enacting, or considering enacting, other similar salaryhistory bans.202
B. The Legislative Pushback
1. The Illinois Veto
Rather than enact legislation similar to the ones seen above,203 the
Governor of Illinois vetoed a bill that would prohibit employers from asking
about an applicant’s prior salary history.204 The Governor stated his support
196

Id. at 806.
Id. at 807.
198
Id.
199
Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 808.
200
Id. at 812.
201
Amanda E. Steinke, Constitutionality of Philadelphia’s Salary History Ban Appealed
to Third Circuit, NAT’L L. REV. (June 12, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
constitutionality-philadelphia-s-salary-history-ban-appealed-to-third-circuit.
202
Peet & McCarthy, supra note 180.
203
See supra Part III.
204
Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Rauner Vetoes Bill That Would Bar Employers from Asking
197
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for eliminating the gender wage gap, but suggested a bill more closely
modeled after the Massachusetts law that would provide employers with
more leeway.205 The Illinois bill did not include the caveat, as found in the
Massachusetts bill, that an employer could seek prior salary history after
offering a candidate the job with a salary.206 There was disappointment in
the Governor vetoing the bill, but the indication that the Governor recognizes
the existence of a gender wage gap and that a prohibition on asking about
prior salary history could eliminate it is encouraging to supporters of the
bill.207
Instead of re-working the bill, those in favor of the bill planned to
override the Governor’s veto legislatively in the November veto session.208
The initial bill passed in the House by a vote of 91-24 and passed in the
Senate by a vote of 35-18 (with one member voting “present”).209 The
override requires seventy-one votes in the House and thirty-six votes in the
Senate, and a Republican representative expressed his optimistic belief that
the override effort will be successful due to the bill’s strong bi-partisan
support.210 On November 9, 2017, however, when the Illinois Senate
attempted to override Governor Rauner’s veto, it failed to do so.211 The
Illinois House had successfully overridden the veto 80-33, but the Illinois
Senate vote, needing three-fifths of members (thirty-six members) to vote in
favor of the override, only garnered twenty-nine “yeas,” seventeen “nays,”
and one “present.”212 At this point, it is unclear what will happen in Illinois
regarding a prohibition against salary history inquiries, but the attempt to
enact such legislation signals the growing desire for such prohibitions.
2. The New Jersey Veto
In the summer of 2017, the New Jersey Legislature put forward an
amendment to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) that
would have enacted similar salary history bans as seen above.213 The law
About Salary History, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 28, 2017, 4:23 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-illinois-no-salary-history-bill-veto-0829-biz-20170828-story.html.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Elejalde-Ruiz, supra note 204.
211
L. Robert Batterman, Emilie Adams & Alex C. Weinstein, Illinois Senate Fails to
Override Governor’s Veto of Salary History Ban, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/illinois-senate-fails-to-override-governor-s-vetosalary-history-ban.
212
Id.
213
Micala Campbell Robinson, A Woman’s Worth: Closing the Gender Pay Gap, N.J.
L.J., (Aug. 21, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid
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would have prohibited employers from: (1) inquiring about an applicant’s
compensation and benefit history at any point during the hiring process; (2)
screening a candidate based on his or her prior salary or benefits history; (3)
using that prior salary history to make pay determinations; and (4) retaliating
against an employee who shared terms and conditions of employment, like
compensation, with other current or former employees.214 A candidate could
volunteer prior salary history, at which point the employer could verify the
information, provided that there was no employer coercion and the candidate
gave written authorization for the inquiry.215
Chris Christie, then-Governor of New Jersey, vetoed this bill on July
25, 2017 because he felt that the law would punish inquiries made without
discriminatory intent or impact in contradiction to the NJLAD.216 Governor
Christie indicated receptiveness to consider a bill that would protect against
wage discrimination without being hostile to business.217 There was an
expectation that once Governor Christie was out of office in early 2018, the
legislature would again introduce the same or a similar bill.218 Phil Murphy,
a Democrat, defeated Republican Kim Guadagno in the New Jersey
gubernatorial election and took office January 16, 2018.219 Governor
Murphy has pledged to sign pay-equity legislation into law, nearly assuring
that New Jersey will have new pay-equity laws, although the specifics of
such legislation are not known.220
3. The Michigan Preemption
On March 26, 2018, the governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, signed
into law a bill that prohibits local governments and municipalities from
regulating employers’ questions for applicants during interviews.221 This bill
=4db8f2d3-bb46-4892-9062-bebb5bda2c27&pdworkfolderid=6de93fbb-eb6d-48a3-98bb-fc
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-79b0-4046-99fe-879eba00ef0c.
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amended a law from 2015 prohibiting local governments from banning
salary history inquiries entirely.222 The law is seen as a clear measure to
block cities and municipalities from banning salary history inquiries, despite
the fact that at the time of signing, no municipality had proposed such an
ordinance.223
C. What’s on the Horizon?
New York City Public Advocate Letitia James expects a legal challenge
from business groups like what occurred in Philadelphia.224 James expects
litigation because of the pushback the New York City law received from
trade associations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.225 She was quoted
as saying, “‘I suspect that someone will probably file a lawsuit,’” adding,
“‘[w]henever you make any change and move the needle forward, it’s
inevitable that some individuals will push back.’”226 As of writing, there is
no indication that any suit has been filed challenging the New York City
law.227
D. A National Ban on Prior Salary History Inquiries
On May 11, 2017, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Democrat
from the District of Columbia, introduced a bill to amend the FLSA to
prohibit certain practices by employers regarding prior salary history, cited
as the “Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.”228 This Act would introduce a new
section, Section 8, to the FLSA making it unlawful for an employer to: (1)
screen prospective employees based on prior salary history in such ways as
(a) requiring that prior salary meet a minimum or maximum criteria, (b)
requesting or requiring prior salary history as a condition of being
interviewed, or (c) conditioning continued consideration for an offer of
employment on the disclosure of prior salary history;229 (2) seek an
applicant’s prior salary history from any current or former employer of the

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ban-salary-history-bans-michigan-bars-localgovernments-prohibiting-such-inquiries.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Vin Gurrieri, NYC Pay History Ban May Face Legal Challenge, Official Says,
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applicant;230 and (3) fire or retaliate against a current or prospective
employee for: (a) opposing any of the practices made unlawful above, (b)
nearing the process of making a complaint against the employer for
violations of this act, or (c) testifying or is about to testify, assist, or
participate in an investigation relating to the prohibited conduct.231 Since
being referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce on
the same day as the bill was introduced, there has been no further action on
the Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.232
V. ACHIEVING THE EPA’S GOALS AND CHANGING THE COURTS’
ANALYSIS
In enacting these laws, either the laws themselves or the lawmakers
signing them have hinted at one of the reasons for the enactment of such
measures: the EPA has failed to accomplish what it set out to do. The
Philadelphia law acknowledges the dismal lack of narrowing in the gender
wage gap since the passage of the EPA and that relying on prior salary
history perpetuates wage inequalities.233 Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York
City, was quoted saying, “‘[i]t is unacceptable that we’re still fighting for
equal pay for equal work. The simple fact is that women and people of color
are frequently paid less for the same work as their white, male
counterparts.”234 He followed with, “[t]his Administration has taken bold
steps to combat the forces of inequality that hold people back, and this bill
builds upon the progress we have made to close the pay gap and ensure
everyone is treated with the respect they deserve.”235 The Mayor of
Delaware echoed a similar sentiment as Mayor Bill de Blasio when signing
the Delaware law into legislation.236 As previously mentioned, noticeably
absent from Oregon’s law outlining the bona fide reasons for a pay disparity
is the vague language of “factor other than sex,” in addition to banning prior
salary history.237 This suggests an awareness that employers have been
utilizing the prior salary history and “factors other than sex” at large to
perpetuate gender wage discrimination. The San Francisco law stated the
same findings as Philadelphia, hinting at a failure of the EPA and how
230
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reliance on prior salary history perpetuates gender wage inequality,
including findings related to Rizo regarding how relying solely on salary
history would be in opposition to the goals of Congress in enacting the
EPA.238 Governor Jerry Brown of California even described the “simple
question” of prior salary as being a “barrier to equal pay.”239 Explicitly or
implicitly, lawmakers are accelerating the goals of the EPA’s prohibitions
against salary history inquiries, no longer acquiescing to the tortoise-like
pace of historical progress.
Furthermore, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether an
employer’s reliance on prior salary history is genuine or a pretext for taking
advantage of discriminatory wage practice, or even if the applicant’s prior
salary was based on sexual discrimination.240 Although circuit courts
acknowledge the potential for employers exploiting prior salary history as a
“factor other than sex,” the circuit courts continue to uphold its use as an
affirmative defense, albeit without any uniformity to its application.241
Another clear, yet unspoken, goal of these state and municipal legislatures is
to eliminate prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” in its entirety so
as to remove it from a court’s consideration when hearing a sex-based wage
discrimination claim. While a “factor other than sex” defense is still
available, prior salary history will no longer serve as an easily identifiable
card for employers to play in the states and cities where the laws have been
enacted.
Businesses will certainly lose one key factor used in the hiring process,
making offering and negotiating a salary more difficult, especially to highranking executives.242 Proponents of the law, however, recognize this will
lead to more hiring decisions based on merit.243 Businesses still have
education, experience, recommendations, references, aptitude tests, etc. to
determine if a candidate is a proper fit for the job. Moreover, most of these
laws do not fully eliminate the ability of an employer from asking about prior
salary history or negotiating once a candidate has voluntarily disclosed such
salary history.244 Eliminating prior salary history as a “factor other than sex”
238
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greatly increases the chances of further closing the wage gap and protecting
women from wage discrimination while leaving businesses no worse off than
before.
VI. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT WHILE THE LEGISLATURES ACT
Even while federal, state, and municipal legislatures push to enact their
own versions of a salary-history inquiry prohibition, those states and towns
without such legislation will be bound to the analysis of the circuit court of
the circuit in which they are located. As such, the differing analyses should
be evaluated and resolved. The reasoning of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
that prior salary history alone cannot be the sole justification as a “factor
other than sex,”245 is flawed because nothing in the EPA or FLSA suggests
this standard. The list of exceptions that the EPA added to the FLSA are
separated with an “or” and in the “factor other than sex” language, “factor”
is singular.246 This construction suggests that an employer need only show
one of the enumerated exceptions, and within the catch-all provision, need
only show one factor other than sex. By insisting that employers show prior
salary history and an additional factor, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits are
imposing a higher burden on employers facing EPA and FLSA wagediscrimination challenges.
Further, the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, that prior salary history
is a valid “factor other than sex” unless there is a showing that the prior salary
was the result of gender discrimination,247 while more reasonable, is too
lenient. This approach does not conduct an inquiry into the current
employer’s potential invidious behavior, and determining whether the prior
employer engaged in gender-based wage discrimination is a daunting task
for employees asserting a violation of the FLSA. The approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit, affording employers more discretion than the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits, affords employers too much discretion.
Additionally, the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit is too extreme.
By eliminating prior salary history from the analysis entirely,248 the court has
taken a potentially legitimate, innocuous factor from an employer’s
determination on pay. While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the relationship
between prior salary history and other legitimate, job-related factors was too
attenuated to permit reliance on prior salary history,249 prior salary history
disclosed such information. See supra Part III.F.
245
See supra Part II.B.
246
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could very well reflect how a previous employer views the quality and worth
of an employee’s work. The Ninth Circuit may be correct in finding that the
“factor other than sex” defense is limited to legitimate, job-related factors,
but it was wrong to take such a broad step in ruling that prior salary history
was not such a factor.
This leaves the last approach taken by a circuit court as the best
approach when resolving a plaintiff’s gender-based wage discrimination
claim—that taken by the Eighth Circuit. That circuit conducts a
reasonableness inquiry into the employer’s use of prior salary history as a
“factor other than sex” or ask whether a reliance on prior salary history
effectuates a business policy.250 This analysis is squarely in the middle of
the approaches mentioned above, imposing less of a burden than the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits do, but affording employers less discretion than the
Seventh Circuit does. The approach of the Eighth Circuit keeps both parties’
interests in mind, suspicious of an employer’s reliance on prior salary
history, but willing to accept the idea that an employer innocently uses prior
salary history as a legitimate factor in determining an employee’s pay. So,
until prior salary history prohibitions are enacted throughout the country,
district courts and circuit courts should adopt the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning
in evaluating claims arising under the FLSA involving prior salary history.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the EPA with the intention of eliminating genderbased wage discrimination. To protect employers, however, this Act listed
exceptions, one of which is a “factor other than sex.” Numerous circuit
courts acknowledge that prior salary history is a “factor other than sex,”
varying by how much weight the courts give to that factor alone, despite the
recognition that prior salary history can be exploited and abused to continue
gender-based wage discrimination. Unsatisfied with the current pace of
progress regarding equal pay, and unwilling to let this matter play out in the
judiciary, multiple legislatures around the country have enacted legislations
prohibiting inquiries into prior salary history. By their own words,
lawmakers appreciate that the EPA alone is not getting the job done and
recognize inquiries into prior salary history stand as an obstacle to full pay
equality for equal work. This march of progress is moving rapidly and will
not stop until prior salary history is eliminated as a “factor other than sex” in
its entirety across the country. As a result, employers will no longer be
allowed to disguise gender-based pay discrimination as an innocent reliance
on prior salary history.
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